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A  simple model  is constructed  to  show  how  partial  vertical  integration  may  emerge  as  an  equilibrium  market  structure  in  a 
world characterized  by rationing,  differences  in the reservation  prices  of buyers,  and in the risk attitudes  of buyers  and sellers. 
The  buyers with  the high reservation  prices  turn  out  to  be vertically  integrated. 
1.  Introduction 
Empirical  analysis  [see,  e.g.,  McDonald  (1985)]  suggests  that  partial  vertical  integration  is  a 
widespread  phenomenon.  However,  there  are  hardly  any  theoretical  explanations  for  this  composi- 
tion  of  industries.  Both  Arrow  (1975)  and  Green  (1986)  explicitly  allow  for  partial  integration  to 
occur.  The  former  author  takes  the  need  for  information  to  be  the  driving  force  behind  vertical 
integration,  whereas  in  the  latter  paper  market  advantages  due  to  integration  versus  decreasing 
returns  to an expansion  of  the scope  of  activities  carried  out by  a single  firm  are  the  opposing  forces. 
In  both  models,  however,  the  industry  equilibrium  tends  to  either  no  integration  at  all,  or  complete 
vertical  integration.  Carlton  (1979)  obtained  an  intermediate  outcome  by  having  risk  averse  buyers 
secure  their  high  probability  demand.  In  the  model  of  Quirmbach  (1986),  scale  and/or  substitution 
effects  are  responsible  for  partial  vertical  integration.  If  a  firm  switches  from  market  exchange  to 
vertical  integration,  then  this  will  change  the  probability  distribution  of  the  spot  market  price.  This 
externality  is  responsible  for  partial  vertical  integration  in  the  model  of  Hendrikse  (1988). 
The  present  note  is  in  the  spirit  of  Green  (1986).  However,  we  will  obtain  partial  vertical 
integration  as an  equilibrium  market  structure,  mainly  by  taking  the  risk  attitudes  of  the  traders  into 
consideration. 
2.  The  model 
The  model  under  consideration  consists  of  m  buyers  and  m  sellers.  Each  buyer  always  wants  to 
buy  one  unit  of  a  given  fixed  product.  The  reservation  price  of  buyer  i  for  the  product  is  R,;  we 
assume  that  R,  >R,>  ...  2  R,  >  0.  All  sellers  are  assumed  to  be  identical;  each  seller  either  has 
one  unit  of  the  product  for  sale,  or  noting  at  all,  the  probability  of  the  first  even  being  q  E  (0,  1). 
0165-1765/89/$3.50  0  1989,  Elsevier  Science  Publishers  B.V.  (North-Holland) 250  G. Hendrikse,  H.  Peters  /  Partial  vertical  integration 
Trade  can  take  place  either  in  a  contract,  or  on  the  spot  market.  Following  Green  (1986)  we 
assume  that  the  price  on  the  spot  market  is  fixed.  More  precisely,  we  assume  it  to  be  equal  to  the 
lowest  reservation  price  of  the  buyers  present  on  the  spot  market;  if  the  spot  market  is  empty,  then 
we define  the  spot  market  ‘price’  to be  R,. 
We  further  assume  that  the  market  for  the  product  is  subject  to  stochastic  fluctuations  in 
exogenous  excess  demand,  leading  to rationing  of  the  market.  The  mechanism  by  which  the  product 
will be  rationed  is  taken  to be  identical  to the  one  used  by  Green  (1986).  There  will  always  be  excess 
demand  in  our model;  a fraction  q  of  the  buyers  will  have  their  demands  met  exactly,  the  remaining 
buyers  will  receive  nothing. 
If  a  buyer  and  a  seller  vertically  integrate,  then  their  relationship  is  governed  by  a  set  of  rules 
which  form  a binding  agreement.  The  alternative  to  vertical  integration  is  to  be  in  the  spot  market. 
The  rules  governing  vertical  integration  are: 
(i)  If,  in a contract  of  a seller  with  a buyer  i,  the  seller  has  a unit  of  the product  of  sale,  then  (s)he 
has  to  deliver  this  unit  for  a price  pi  to buyer  i. 
(ii)  If,  in  the  same  contract,  the  seller  does  not  have  the  product  for  sale,  then  both  buyer  and 
seller  still  receive  their  loss  of  surplus.  These  payments  will  be  covered  by  insurance  premiums 
rb(R,,  p,)  and  T’(R,,  p,),  respectively. 
Let  S  denote  the  set  of  buyers  and  sellers  on  the  spot  market,  and  let  S’  denote  its  complement, 
i.e.,  the  set  of  buyers  and  sellers  in  contracts.  ’  Let  p(S)  denote  the  price  on  the  spot  market.  Let  g 
take  the  value  1  if  the  seller  has  a  unit  for  sale,  i.e.,  the  buyer  acquires  the  product,  and  let  77  be  0 
otherwise.  We  write  the  (pure)  payoffs  of  buyer  i  (b,)  and  seller  i  (s,)  as  follows: 
I 
0  if  n =0  and  iES, 
R,  -p(S)  if  71=1  and  iES, 
b,(S,  7)  =  R,-pi-rb(R,,  p,)  if  n=O  and  iESC, 
R,  -P,  -  rb(R,>  P,)  if  n =  1  and  i E  SC, 
0  if  q=O  and  iES, 
S,(S>  77) = 
P(S)  if  7~=1  and  iES, 
P, -  r’(R,,  P,)  if  n =  0  and  i E SC, 
pI-vr’(R,,p,)  if  n=l  and  iESC. 
Let  u  and  u  denote  the  (von  Neumann-Morgenstern)  utility  functions  of  sellers  and  buyers, 
respectively,  normalized  such  that  u(0)  =  u(O) = 0.  Our  crucial  assumption  is  that  u  is  (weakly) 
convex  and  u  is  (weakly)  concave,  i.e.,  that  buyers  are  (weakly)  risk  averse  whereas  sellers  are 
(weakly)  risk  prone. 
We  call  a  market  structure  S  and  equilibrium  market  structure  2  if  there  exists  a  set  of  prices 
c Pll,ES’  such  that: 
ViESC:  u(R,-  P, -  rb(R,>  pi>>  >qu(R,  -p(SU  {i>>), 
’  Since  in  our  model  always  exactly  m  pairs  of  buyers  and  sellers  will  be  formed,  we  (slightly  mis)use  the  same  letter  to  denote 
the  buyer,  the  seller,  or  the  pair,  depending  on  the  context. 
2  The  model  could  be  formulated  as  a  noncooperative  game  in  which  partial  vertical  integration  emerges  as  a  Nash 
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C Tb(Ri, P,) +TS(Ri,  P,)  =  C  (l  -4JRi? 




and  such  that  for  no j  E  S  there  is  a price  pj  with 
u(R,-pj-nb(R,,  Pj))‘P(Rj-Pw),  (4) 
(5) 
C  Tb(Ri, Pi) + Ts(R,3  Pi)=  c  (l-q)&.  (6) 
iESCU(j}  ic.VU(j) 
In  writing  down  the  above  conditions,  we use  the  fact  that  u and  u are  von  Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility  functions,  which  assign  expected  utilities  to  risky  events.  Conditions  (3)  and  (6)  are  insurance 
balance  conditions.  Conditions  (1)  and  (2)  keep  buyers  and  sellers  from  breaking  contracts  and 
wander  off  to the  spot  market,  conditions  (4)  and  (5)  prevent  the  reverse  phenomenon.  In  (2)  and  (5) 
we  use  equality  signs:  this  is  a  reasonable  simplification  in  view  of  the  fact  that  all  sellers  were 
supposed  to be  identical.  The  strict  inequality  signs  in  (1)  and  (4)  reflect  out  assumption  that,  in case 
of  indifference,  a buyer  chooses  to  be  in  the  spot  market. 
In  what  follows,  we will  assume  that  the  insurance  premiums  have  the  following  simple  forms: 
rs(R,, Pi>  =nPi,  7Tb(R~7  Pi)  =Ir(R,-Pi)  forsome  O<a<l.  (7) 
That  is,  each  party  covers  its  own  risk. 
Proposition  1.  Suppose  the  insurance  premiums  are  given  by  (7).  Then: 
(a)  If  7~  #  1 -  q,  then  there  exists  a  unique  equilibrium  market  structure  S,,  giuen  by  Sg = 0. 
(b)  Suppose  r  =  1 -  q.  Then  there  exists  a  unique  equilibrium  market  structure  S,,  which  has  the 
following  form:  there  is an  0 <  is.  <  m  with  i E  S,  if and  only  if  i >  is.. 
Proof.  (a)  follows  immediately  from  (3)  and  (6).  We  now  assume  r  =  1 -  q.  We  first  prove  the 
following  statement:  If  S  is  an  equilibrium  market  structure  and  SC # 0,  then 
S=  {i:i>i,},  (8) 
where  is  :=max{i:iESC}  andmaxfl:=O. 
Let  S  be  as in the  antecedent  of (8).  If  S =  0,  then  we are  done.  So we assume  S  #  0. Note  that  p,, 
solves  solves  (2),  i.e.,  v(pi,)  =  qu(p(S  u  {i,}))  =  qu(R,).  Here,  the  last  equality  follows  from  the 
definition  of  i,.  Also  note  that  i,  < m;  otherwise,  since  the  convexity  of  v implies  p,,  2  R,,  we  would 
have  pm  z= R,,  which  implies  that  (1)  would  be  violated.  Now  suppose  there  is  a  j  <  is  with  j  E  S. 
Define  p,=pi,.  Then,  since  p(S)=p(SU  {i,})=  R,,  the  equations  in  (5)  as  well  as  in  (6)  are 
satisfied  for  this  j,  so  the  equation  in  (4)  cannot  hold,  i.e.: 
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By  (1)  we  also  have 
+l(Ky -P,>)  ’  4U(RjT  - R,).  (10) 
We  set  a =  Rir -p,,  b =  R,7 -  R,  >  a.  Then  R,  -pj  =  a +  c  and  Rj  -  R,  =  b +  c  for  some  c 2  0. 
Rewriting  (9)  and  (10)  we  obtain 
+(a  +  0)  Q qu(b  +  0,  (11) 
u(qa)  ’  db).  (12) 
From  (ll),  (12),  and  the  concavity  of  U, we  derive  [qu(  b + E) -  qu(  b)  >  u(q(  a + E)) -  u( qu)  2  u( a + 
qc)  -  u(u)  =  u(q(u  + <) +  (1-  q)u)  -  u(u)  >, qu(u  +  c)  -  qu(u).]  hence  [u(b  +  c)  -  u(b)  >  u(u  + c) 
-  u(u).]  The  concavity  of  u  then  implies  b < a,  a  contradiction.  This  completes  the  proof  of  (8). 
Now  let  S,  be  an  equilibrium  market  structure.  First  consider  the  case  that  S,” = $,  i.e.,  is*  = 0. 
Suppose  there  was  another  equilibrium  market  structure  S.  Then  SC f  0.  In  particular,  by  (8),  1 E  SC 
and  p(S)  = R,  =p(S,).  So  there  is  a  p1  such  that  (1)  and  (2)  hold  for  1 E  SC. But  then,  by  taking 
j  =  1 and  pj =pl,  we have  a  violation  of  (4)-(6)  applied  for  S,.  In  the  other  case,  where  Si  #  ,0, we 
prove  uniqueness  of  the  equilibrium  in  an  analogous  way. 
In  order  to  show  existence,  we  determine  the  (constant)  eventual  contract  price  p,  by  solving  (2), 
that  is  u(qp,)  =  qu(R,).  Next,  we  let  i,  be  the  largest  index  i  for  which  (1)  can  be  satisfied,  so 
Is  =  max  {i  : u(q(  Ri -pi))  > qu( R,  -  R,)}  with  max  ,0 =  0.  Then  an  equilibrium  market  structure  is 
S={i:i>i,}.  0 
The  following  simple  example  shows  that  nontrivial  partial  vertical  integration  may  occur.  Let 
there  be  three  sellers  and  three  buyers  with  R,  =  5,  R,  =  3,  R,  =  1.  Let  u(t)  =  fi  (1 >, 0)  and 
u(t)  =  t,  and  let  q =  1 -  v  =  A.  Then  the  unique  equilibrium  market  structure  is  given  by  S =  { 3). 
Further:  p(S)  = R,  =  1,  pI  = p2 =  1.  This  example  also  shows  that  for  proper  partial  vertical 
integration  to  occur,  sellers  may  be  risk  neutral.  If  u(t)  =  t*,  then  we  obtain  the  same  equilibrium 
structure  with  prices  p1 = p2 =  i. 
3.  Conclusion 
A  simple  model  was  constructed  to  show  how  partial  vertical  integration  may  emerge  as  an 
equilibrium  market  structure  in  an  environment  characterized  by  rationing,  differences  in  the 
reservation  prices  of  buyers,  and  in  the  risk  attitudes  of  buyers  and  sellers. 
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